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Abstract
In conventional simulator trainings operatorsare trained to meet work demands by following standard procedures. Sustainable 
simulator trainings should additionally include practice to cope with unknown and unexpected, potentially hazardous system 
states. This does not only mean to prepare teams to successfully handle unknown problems but alsoto learn from shown coping 
behavior of teams from an organizational perspective.That is important for the organizational development toward system-
safety.The present article describes the training concept that was developed for control room teams in a Swissnuclear power 
plant, with due regard to methods of organizational learning. The focus lieson the identification of successful behavioral strate-
gies thecontrol roomteams already show to maintain the plant’s safetyduring critical situations. By identification of central strate-
gies of successful team behavior a training concept including a method for structuring such coping behavior (“PUMA”)was
developed. The training is already implemented as inherent part of annualsimulation trainings in the control room simulator of 
the nuclear power plant. Additionally “PUMA” is established as an official method used for coping with unexpected situations in 
the control room.A worldwide recommendation of the training concept, including the method "PUMA", is currently under ex-
amination by the "World association of Nuclear of operator" (WANO).
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1. Introduction
Resilience as property of a system keeps the organization alive byachieving safety as inherent outcome of a work 
process under varying conditions.Varying conditions provoke organizations to generate many adaptations when 
following its intended objectives. 
On the one hand, organizations try to avoid provocative situational contexts related to their production processes. 
As reaction on incidents with a potential harmful outcome in the past, organizational standards are adapted to avoid 
the development of similar hazardous outcomes in the future. Adapted standards (like procedures, automation or 
rules) shall lead to a prevention of the occurrence of hazardous situations. 
On the other hand, the prevention of critical situations can also result in an unintended loss of knowledge and 
skills for the coping of unexpected situations. In case of absence ofexperience in dealing with unexpected and/or 
unknown situations, coping competence is adversely affected. When task complexity exceeds the limit of predefined 
procedures a collective coping of critical system behavior is absolute essential to maintain system control and safe-
ty.Safety can be described on as a "dynamic non-event" [1]. Therefore, it has to be continually built up by the con-
trol room team through adaptive actions in relation to the situational context. Apart from following highly standar-
dized procedures teams have to be capable to switch to flexible team coordination in order to manage unexpected 
and unknown situations. The control room teams thus need knowledge and skills for adaptive, resilient action to 
cope with such situations.
The development of these skills can be supported through the organization by providing adequate team training 
and as well asa structuring methodto reduce the given complexity. The method should activate a collective work 
mode and guide the team to collectivelydevelop a situation-specific task model. While extracting the relevant infor-
mation out of the system and analyzing the situation,by means of pooling of all the team members’ competencies, an 
adequate action pattern has to be carved out.Meanwhile the team has to deal with a high degree of uncertainty.Grote
[2, p. 12] explains uncertainty by the definition of Galbraith [3] as “…the difference between the amount of infor-
mation required to perform a task and the amount of information already possessed by the organization“. A concept 
for the coping of unexpected situations should take into account that teams of experts have the expertise to solve 
operational problems by applying implicit knowledge and skills that result out of long term work experience [4]. 
Under this assumption the question is how teams can be trained in activating and applying their coping capacity.
This question is linking to one aim of the research project “TeamSafe”[5], which was to develop a resilience-
based team training concept by imparting knowledge and skills with regard to adaptive, resilient team behavior. The 
training concept presented was elaborated and tested in collaboration with a Swiss nuclear power plant over a period 
of three years. The training concept realizes organizational learning using the advantages of expert teams.It fosters
theconversion of implicitinto explicit knowledge as well asthe sharing of implicit knowledge that cannot be ex-
pressed verbally.This includes different learning methods, such as the presentation of positive behavioral examples 
from video recordings.
2. How to train adaptive behavior directed towards safety? A team training concept for control room teams
In unexpected critical situations, safety has to be restored by the control room team by executing standardized 
procedures as well as by creative problem solving activities in case that the situation is not covered by standardized 
procedures. As mentionedabove, from a resilience engineering perspective it can be assumed that relevant adaptive 
behaviors to cope successfully with unexpected and unknown events are already existent and displayed by the indi-
viduals and teams during their actual work. Human variability preserves imperfect systems of failing under uncer-
tain and dynamic circumstances[6]and is thus helpful for dealing with unexpected and not anticipated situations. 
Even if standardized procedures exist, theirapplianceis not exactly similar in every control room [7]. Based on these 
assumptions, the team training concept aims to reveal such variability in resilient adaptive behaviors within the 
control room teams in order to make different successful coping strategies explicit for other teams as a basis for 
organizational learning. The idea that each control room team has its own, or at least slightly different, approach for 
dealing withunknown situations and that occasions for mutual learning and knowledge exchange provide benefit for 
control room teams run like a thread through the development process of the training concept. Considerations of the 
organizational learning literature were taken into consideration in the training concept.
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2.1. Process of training concept development
The training concept was developed in cooperation with a Swiss nuclear power plant over a three years period. 
The contribution and participation of the control room teams and the instructors of the simulator training centercons-
titute an essential part in the development process of making the (implicit) knowledge of the control room teams 
more and more explicit and overt.
In the first step of the project, the researchers observed the control room teams dealing with unexpected and un-
known events in the simulation-training center. Each control room team was videotaped during its training session. 
This step enabled the researchers to identify different resilient competencies of the control room teams. The obser-
vations were reviewed and structured according to relevant findings in the team performance literature (concerning 
adaptive team behavior [8], team decision making [9], problem solving[10] and resilience engineering[11]). Impor-
tant resilient behaviors were brought together and structured, resulting in the method “PUMA” [12]. “PUMA” sup-
ports the teams in dealing with unexpected and unknown situations by providing a flexible procedural structure 
(further details will be explained within the following chapter 3). A first draft for the team training concept was 
worked out, including the application of “PUMA” as a relevant content, accompanied by supporting team behaviors 
and team processes (communication, coordination, attention location). In a second step, the conceptualized proto-
type of the training, including the appliance of “PUMA”, was tested during the annual simulator trainingof the con-
trol room teams.
The training takes one full workday and is conducted with each control room team separately. After the comple-
tion of the simulator training with all the control room teams within the nuclear power plant, the training concept 
was adapted according to the participants' feedback. It was put into practice again in the following year (third step) 
and evaluated[9] with an anonymous survey among the participants. In the future, the training will be implemented 
as an integral part of the annualsimulator training and conducted by the educational experts of the nuclear power 
plant.
2.2. Structure, content and methods of training sessions
The structure and content of the particular training sessions are intended to make resilient (adaptive) behaviors 
explicit for all teams and provide opportunities to practice and internalize them into the operators’ and teams own 
behavioral repertoires. Table 1shows the structural construction of the training, divided into three phases.
Table 1. Training structure (phases classified in dependence on [13], types of knowledge classified in dependence on Ryle [13]).
Phases Contents Types of knowledge acquired
1) Information based phase Theoretical Input "Know that"
Presentation of PUMA-method "Know that"
2) Demonstration based phase Video-based demonstration (observational learning) and 
guided group reflection
"Know how"
3) Practice based phase Role play (shared practice) "Know how"
Practice in high fidelity simulator (shared practice) and 
debriefing
“Know how”
As mentioned above, the training concept should represent an ongoing disclosure of knowledge and competen-
cies already available in the "competence-pool" of control room teams. Ryle [14] classifies knowledge into "know 
that" and "know how", which corresponds with the differentiation between explicit and tacit. While "know that" can 
be transmitted in form of precepts and rules, "know how" is acquired by practice. According to Ryle, "know that" is 
not useful on its own but requires appropriate "know how" to become actionable. So, Ryle argues that it does not 
make sense to base knowledge exchange only on explicit knowledge, but rather provide opportunities for practice to 
build "know how" in relation to which explicit "know that" becomes meaningful and applicable [13]. The structure 
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of the training sessions represents this process by composing different methods for going from theoretical know-
ledge to collective knowledge by shared practices.
The phases of the training sessions looked in detail as follows:
1) The theoretical input is composed of psychological concepts that are relevant for the working context, such as 
situation awareness [15], shared mental models [16], confirmation bias and group think [9, 17]. They are pre-
sented by psychologists in a for laypersons comprehensible way in order to sensitizing the operators for psycho-
logical phenomena that can affect the processes of information exchange and decision making within the team. 
After that input, “PUMA” is presented as a resource to structure these processes in situations when there are no 
standardized procedures available.
2) In the demonstration-basedphase, positive behaviors ofthe different teams (which have been recorded during the 
last training session one year before) are presented on video. Thereby, already existing resilient competencies of 
the teams are presented as good examples, considering the resilience engineering approach, and shared between 
the teams through model oriented learning [18]. Specific resilient team behaviors, such as coordination, informa-
tion exchange or dealing with uncertainty, are observed, discussed and reflected within the group. Dialogues and 
collective reflection trigger and facilitate the externalization of knowledge (what means that knowledge held by 
individuals is shared with others),constituting a crucial step in the organizational learning process [19].The se-
quenceoffers an opportunity to communicate "know how" within a contextual frame by observing a positive role 
model, as Schön [20, p. 32] says: "If we want to discover what someone knows-in-action, we must put ourselves 
in a position to observe her [sic!] in action.”
3) During the practice based section the teams train how to deal with unexpected and unknown events, by means of 
“PUMA”. Such “shared practice” provides the opportunity to share tacit knowledge (implicit knowledge that 
cannot fully be transmitted through explicit explanations) among the operators without the necessity of making it 
explicit [21].First, a flexible application of the procedure provided by “PUMA” is practiced and internalized in 
the course of a role-play exercise. The exercise is carried outin a classroom setting and consists of finding a solu-
tion to a unexpected work related problem with the support of the "PUMA" method. During this exercise the 
teams gain a first fundamental experience in applying the method. Later on, the acquired knowledge can be ap-
plied during two different scenarios in the organization’s private high-fidelity simulator. At this point, complexity 
is increased from the simplified role-play to real work conditions. Directly after having completed the scenario, 
the teams were given feedback and the opportunity for collective reflection (debriefing).
The methods applied in the presented training concept are all intended to initiate knowledge-transfer from an in-
dividual level up to the group and organizational level, giving opportunities for externalization, socialization, com-
bination and internalization, according to the framework of organizational learning of Nonaka and Takeuchi [19]. 
As explained, the underlying assumption is that crucial resilient competencies are already existent in the form of 
(implicit) knowledge on an individual basis and on team level and need to be made explicit and shared. “PUMA”, as
an implemented tool for the teams’ operational work, completes the organizational learning process as aggregated 
knowledge is anchored on the organizational level. It is therefore institutionalized ina “collective mind” [22; 23] and 
guides and supports the employees’ coping with unexpected and unknown events. Thereby, the resilience of the 
system is enhanced through a dynamic learning process.
3. PUMA: A structuring methodfor dealing with uncertainty
In situations that are not covered by standard procedures control room teams have to deal with uncertainty. They 
must switch from a process guided to a flexible, collective work modeof coordinated information exchange and 
reflection within the entire team.The method “PUMA”is designed to support this demanding process by providing a 
procedural structure and therefore topromote resilience by facilitating the control room teams' ability to adapt to 
unexpected and unknown situations. 
In unexpected and unknown situations a team has to build up a new concept of the situational conditions as part 
of an adaptation process [24]. Due to the use of “PUMA”, team members can pool their expertise and system skills 
to develop problem solutions while maintaining system control in a save way. The individual knowledge and infor-
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mation each team member holds about the state of the specific systems of the plant can be valuable for building up 
an accurate image or map of the whole situation. Interaction and communication processes are in the center of this 
re-construction process within the team. Structuring and coordination of the interaction process are two of the main 
tasks for the team leader (shift supervisor). The gathering of information with all team members needs an atmos-
phere of openness, so that members also have the courage for speaking-up [25]. Formal interventions can help to 
structure this process and to open a window of opportunity for information collection, discussion and reflexivity 
within the team [26, 27].“PUMA” fulfills the function of giving the control room team and the team leader an op-
portunity of shifting attention from the task execution to the discussion and reflection of the actual situation and 
serves as a formal intervention[27]for the reflecting process within the team.
As mentioned in chapter 2.1, “PUMA” was developed on the basis of the observations of successful team beha-
vior in the simulator. Successful strategies were extracted and condensed into a weakly structured sequence of dis-
cussion steps. “PUMA” navigates two different elements of the teamwork during unexpected and unknown situa-
tions in the control room of the nuclear power plant: First, the steps of a structured problem solving process and 
second, the coordination of the collaboration in the team. The acronym “PUMA”(see Table 2 for further explana-
tion) represents the steps of a problem-solving process: Problem (problem) - Ursache (cause) - Massnahme (meas-
ure) - Ausführung (execution). Each of these steps in the structure comprises four to five questions. The collective 
answering ofthese questions allows a team to activate a process in which the uncertainty of a situation can be re-
duced. By distinguishing relevant from irrelevant information and identifying insufficient or lacking information an
action plan can be developed. As part of this process contradictions need to be detected and discusseduntil the team 
members accept an action plan. In order tosupport a team in processing these steps a decision matrix with predefined 
criteria for an evaluation of measures and actions plans is supplied within the “PUMA” method. The decision matrix 
is to be filled out by the responsible shift supervisoralone. In this way tendency of groups for risky decisions [17]
can be reduced.The result of the matrix evaluation serves as basis for the decision, whether the action plan shall be 
executed or not.
Table 2.PUMA problem-solving process steps.
Step Discussion
"problem" The observations of all team members are collected and the reason for the use of PUMA is stated. Coherent and 
conflicting observations and symptoms are discussed. If there are any not already applied urgent measures (e.g. 
evacuation of the containment) that have to be taken immediately (e.g. due to quick situation escalation) they 
should be taken here
"cause" The control room team tries to understand the cause of the collected observations and symptoms. If assumptions 
can be made the team should try to verify these by additional information.
"measures" Possible measures to cope with the situation are discussed with consideration of the available time. The 
discussed measures are evaluated for safety as well as time and resource requirements.
"execution" Tasks are assigned; priorities and monitoring parameters are set.
The coordination of the problem solving and decision process is assisted by recommendations for the application 
of the “PUMA” steps in team discussions(Table 2). The intention is to give all team members the opportunity to 
participate in the process of answering the questions of the structuring steps mentioned above. Especially the encou-
ragement of reflexivity and inclusion of all team members for information collection, situation assessment and plan-
ning of measures is supported by the tool.
It is important to note that the “PUMA” method makes no strict guide that must be followed by a team. It is in-
tentionally weakly structured to give the possibility for necessary situational adaptation. It is recommended to fully 
process all steps of the method in the team. Nevertheless, there is no obligation for this. The “PUMA” method can 
be aborted at any time. It should support the team in handling an unexpected and unknown situation by allowing 
flexibility and autonomy and thus enable optimal adaptation. To be able to handle a situation adaptively, the applica-
tion of “PUMA” should not have a limiting effect on the operating control room team.
The “PUMA” method was positively evaluated and is now a part of the nuclear power plant in which it was de-
veloped. Is has become part of the annual simulator training for all members of the control room teams.
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4. Conclusion
The presented training concept indicates a beginning for the support of the adaptability of teams to manage un-
known and unexpected situations systematically by means of their inherent competencies.The training, under the use 
of the method “PUMA”, supports control room teams in strengthening their existing competence in dealing with 
unpredictable system constellations by giving opportunities for knowledge exchange and practice as well as by ex-
tending the teams’ behavioral repertoire.Dialogue and common reflections over all control room teams are fostered
by different methods, such as the presentation of situation-specific positive (social) behavioral models via video 
recordings. This approach allows sharing operative practice ina constructive way, by consideration of cultural "basic 
assumptions" of the organization [28, 29]. Knowledge can be externalized as well as shared through non-verbal 
ways from the individual level to the group level and finally be integrated on the organizational level. The project 
“TeamSafe” triggered a process of cultural development as the balancebetween organizational standardized proce-
dures and flexible adaptive human behavior is brought into focus. In terms of organizational learning, organizations 
can profit from the circumstance that learning is an inherent part of their existence. What is learned and how it is 
learned, is covert in work experience ofeach member and each organization unit. Using more positive examples 
seems a sophisticated approachto involve organizationalmembers in organizational learning to a greater extent. The 
dynamic process of generating safety through organizational learning can thereby be kept in a motivational way.
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